pub const Parsed = struct pub fn slice(p: Parsed, s: Slice) []const u8pub fn issuer(p: Parsed) []const u8pub fn subject(p: Parsed) []const u8pub fn commonName(p: Parsed) []const u8pub fn signature(p: Parsed) []const u8pub fn pubKey(p: Parsed) []const u8pub fn message(p: Parsed) []const u8pub fn subjectAltName(p: Parsed) []const u8pub fn verify(parsed_subject: Parsed, parsed_issuer: Parsed, now_sec: i64) VerifyError!voidThis function verifies:
pub fn verifyHostName(parsed_subject: Parsed, host_name: []const u8) VerifyHostNameError!voidfn checkHostName(host_name: []const u8, dns_name: []const u8) boolCheck hostname according to RFC2818 specification:
If more than one identity of a given type is present in the certificate (e.g., more than one DNSName name, a match in any one of the set is considered acceptable.) Names may contain the wildcard character * which is considered to match any single domain name component. E.g., .a.com matches foo.a.com but not bar.foo.a.com. Partial wildcards like f.com are not supported.
fn checkIpAddress(host_name: []const u8, ip_address: []const u8) boolCheck IP address according to RFC 5280 §4.2.1.6.
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402pub const Parsed = struct {
certificate: Certificate,
issuer_slice: Slice,
subject_slice: Slice,
common_name_slice: Slice,
signature_slice: Slice,
signature_algorithm: Algorithm,
pub_key_algo: PubKeyAlgo,
pub_key_slice: Slice,
message_slice: Slice,
subject_alt_name_slice: Slice,
validity: Validity,
version: Version,
pub const PubKeyAlgo = union(AlgorithmCategory) {
rsaEncryption: void,
rsassa_pss: void,
X9_62_id_ecPublicKey: NamedCurve,
curveEd25519: void,
};
pub const Validity = struct {
not_before: u64,
not_after: u64,
};
pub const Slice = der.Element.Slice;
pub fn slice(p: Parsed, s: Slice) []const u8 {
return p.certificate.buffer[s.start..s.end];
}
pub fn issuer(p: Parsed) []const u8 {
return p.slice(p.issuer_slice);
}
pub fn subject(p: Parsed) []const u8 {
return p.slice(p.subject_slice);
}
pub fn commonName(p: Parsed) []const u8 {
return p.slice(p.common_name_slice);
}
pub fn signature(p: Parsed) []const u8 {
return p.slice(p.signature_slice);
}
pub fn pubKey(p: Parsed) []const u8 {
return p.slice(p.pub_key_slice);
}
pub fn message(p: Parsed) []const u8 {
return p.slice(p.message_slice);
}
pub fn subjectAltName(p: Parsed) []const u8 {
return p.slice(p.subject_alt_name_slice);
}
pub const VerifyError = error{
CertificateIssuerMismatch,
CertificateNotYetValid,
CertificateExpired,
CertificateSignatureAlgorithmUnsupported,
CertificateSignatureAlgorithmMismatch,
CertificateFieldHasInvalidLength,
CertificateFieldHasWrongDataType,
CertificatePublicKeyInvalid,
CertificateSignatureInvalidLength,
CertificateSignatureInvalid,
CertificateSignatureUnsupportedBitCount,
CertificateSignatureNamedCurveUnsupported,
};
/// This function verifies:
/// * That the subject's issuer is indeed the provided issuer.
/// * The time validity of the subject.
/// * The signature.
pub fn verify(parsed_subject: Parsed, parsed_issuer: Parsed, now_sec: i64) VerifyError!void {
// Check that the subject's issuer name matches the issuer's
// subject name.
if (!mem.eql(u8, parsed_subject.issuer(), parsed_issuer.subject())) {
return error.CertificateIssuerMismatch;
}
if (now_sec < parsed_subject.validity.not_before)
return error.CertificateNotYetValid;
if (now_sec > parsed_subject.validity.not_after)
return error.CertificateExpired;
switch (parsed_subject.signature_algorithm) {
inline .sha1WithRSAEncryption,
.sha224WithRSAEncryption,
.sha256WithRSAEncryption,
.sha384WithRSAEncryption,
.sha512WithRSAEncryption,
=> |algorithm| return verifyRsa(
algorithm.Hash(),
parsed_subject.message(),
parsed_subject.signature(),
parsed_issuer.pub_key_algo,
parsed_issuer.pubKey(),
),
inline .ecdsa_with_SHA224,
.ecdsa_with_SHA256,
.ecdsa_with_SHA384,
.ecdsa_with_SHA512,
=> |algorithm| return verify_ecdsa(
algorithm.Hash(),
parsed_subject.message(),
parsed_subject.signature(),
parsed_issuer.pub_key_algo,
parsed_issuer.pubKey(),
),
.md2WithRSAEncryption, .md5WithRSAEncryption => {
return error.CertificateSignatureAlgorithmUnsupported;
},
.curveEd25519 => return verifyEd25519(
parsed_subject.message(),
parsed_subject.signature(),
parsed_issuer.pub_key_algo,
parsed_issuer.pubKey(),
),
}
}
pub const VerifyHostNameError = error{
CertificateHostMismatch,
CertificateFieldHasInvalidLength,
};
pub fn verifyHostName(parsed_subject: Parsed, host_name: []const u8) VerifyHostNameError!void {
// If the Subject Alternative Names extension is present, this is
// what to check. Otherwise, only the common name is checked.
const subject_alt_name = parsed_subject.subjectAltName();
if (subject_alt_name.len == 0) {
// note: checkIpAddress is intentionally omitted, as it is not permitted in the common name field anyway.
if (checkHostName(host_name, parsed_subject.commonName())) {
return;
} else {
return error.CertificateHostMismatch;
}
}
const general_names = try der.Element.parse(subject_alt_name, 0);
var name_i = general_names.slice.start;
while (name_i < general_names.slice.end) {
const general_name = try der.Element.parse(subject_alt_name, name_i);
name_i = general_name.slice.end;
switch (@as(GeneralNameTag, @fromBackingInt(@intCast(@backingInt(general_name.identifier.tag))))) {
.dNSName => {
const dns_name = subject_alt_name[general_name.slice.start..general_name.slice.end];
if (checkHostName(host_name, dns_name)) return;
},
.iPAddress => {
const ip_address = subject_alt_name[general_name.slice.start..general_name.slice.end];
if (checkIpAddress(host_name, ip_address)) return;
},
else => {},
}
}
return error.CertificateHostMismatch;
}
// Check hostname according to RFC2818 specification:
//
// If more than one identity of a given type is present in
// the certificate (e.g., more than one DNSName name, a match in any one
// of the set is considered acceptable.) Names may contain the wildcard
// character * which is considered to match any single domain name
// component. E.g., *.a.com matches foo.a.com but not bar.foo.a.com.
// Partial wildcards like f*.com are not supported.
fn checkHostName(host_name: []const u8, dns_name: []const u8) bool {
// Empty strings should not match
if (host_name.len == 0 or dns_name.len == 0) return false;
// RFC 6125 Section 6.4.1: Exact match (case-insensitive)
if (std.ascii.eqlIgnoreCase(dns_name, host_name)) {
return true; // exact match
}
// RFC 6125 Section 6.4.3: Wildcard certificates
// Wildcard must be leftmost label and in the form "*.rest.of.domain"
if (dns_name.len >= 3 and mem.startsWith(u8, dns_name, "*.")) {
const wildcard_suffix = dns_name[2..];
// No additional wildcards allowed in the suffix
if (mem.find(u8, wildcard_suffix, "*") != null) return false;
// Find the first dot in hostname to split first label from rest
const dot_pos = mem.find(u8, host_name, ".") orelse return false;
// Wildcard matches exactly one label, so compare the rest
const host_suffix = host_name[dot_pos + 1 ..];
// Match suffixes (case-insensitive per RFC 6125)
return std.ascii.eqlIgnoreCase(wildcard_suffix, host_suffix);
}
return false;
}
// Check IP address according to RFC 5280 §4.2.1.6.
fn checkIpAddress(host_name: []const u8, ip_address: []const u8) bool {
switch (ip_address.len) {
4 => {
// port is irrelevant to SAN matching, so 0 is a harmless placeholder.
const address = net.Ip4Address.parse(host_name, 0) catch return false;
return mem.eql(u8, &address.bytes, ip_address);
},
16 => {
const address = net.Ip6Address.parse(host_name, 0) catch return false;
return mem.eql(u8, &address.bytes, ip_address);
},
else => return false, // a malformed certificate, neither 4 nor 16 octets
}
}
}